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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
to examine the quantitative macroeconomic implications of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy for France, Germany and the UK. The model
incorporates real wage rigidity which is the particular market failure
justifying policy intervention. We subject the model to productivity
shocks and use either government consumption or investment to react
to the output gap or the public debt-to-output ratio. If the object
of fiscal policy is purely to stabilize output or debt volatility, then
our results suggest substantial reductions can be obtained, especially
with respect to output. In stark contrast, however, a formal general
equilibrium welfare assessment of the volatility implications of these
alternative instrument/target combinations reveals the welfare gains
from active policy, measured as a share of consumption, to be very
modest.
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The empirical evidence points to the adoption of increasingly countercycli-
cal polices by governments in OECD countries over the postwar period. [Galí,
2005]
1 Introduction
Despite the relative neglect of fiscal compared to monetary policy since the
1970s, there has been somewhat of a revival in the interests of European
policymakers and academics for the need and scope for counter-cyclical fiscal
stabilization policy (see, e.g. Andres and Domenech (2006), the papers in
the CESifo Economic Studies (2005) volume and recent theoretical papers on
feedback fiscal policy, e.g. Aloi et al. (2003), Christiano and Harrison (1999)
and Guo and Lansing (1998)). While most theorists seem to prefer the use of
automatic stabilizers to active1 policy rules (and even more to discretionary
policy), in practice, as pointed out by Galí (2005) above, policymakers do
change their fiscal policies when the economic fundamentals change.
In Europe, post Maastricht, this is obviously related to the fact that mon-
etary policy is no longer an option for individual countries, but also to the
recent sustained slow growth in the French and German economies. This
renewed interest in countercyclical fiscal stabilization policy begs a number
of important questions regarding which, if any, of the potential fiscal instru-
ments available to policymakers will be able to deliver the desired degree of
stability. More importantly, will this stability be welfare improving?2
At the same time, due to the conditions of the Maastricht Treaty (MT)
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), there have also been recommenda-
tions in Europe to correct public finance imbalances by adding, for instance,
the public debt-to-GDP ratio, or the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio, to the
set of fundamentals that fiscal authorities should respond to. For instance,
these rules suggest that government spending should fall whenever the pub-
lic debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds the critical value of 60% or when the budget
deficit-to-GDP ratio is in excess of 3%.
With this background in mind, we construct a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model to examine the quantitative macroeconomic
implications of countercyclical state-contingent fiscal policies for France, Ger-
many and the U.K.. These rules imply that those charged with the conduct
1We will use the terms state-contingent, state-dependent, active and feedback inter-
changeably.
2Note that policymakers may even follow pro-cyclical policy which further undermines
the role of automatic stabilizers. Pro-cyclical policies are typically associated with political
distortions. It is not the aim of this paper to analyse the effects of these policies.
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of fiscal policy adjust their policy instruments to the current economic situ-
ation, in a manner that is beyond the role played by automatic stabilizers.
In an attempt to more closely replicate the output dynamics that appear in
macroeconomic data, our model includes capital adjustment costs and real
wage rigidity. The latter is particularly relevant for Europe and is the mar-
ket failure justifying policy intervention in our setup. Actually, it is widely
believed that real wage rigidity is one of the most important distortions in
most European economies.
The model’s structural parameters for France, Germany and the UK are
obtained using standard calibration methods. To assess the fit of these DSGE
models to that of unrestricted VARs, we employ Watson’s (1993) root mean
square approximation error measure for calibrated models. We show that
the model fit generally improves substantially with the inclusion of capital
adjustment costs and real wage rigidity.
Our policy instruments include the three major items of public spend-
ing (i.e. public consumption, investment and transfers) and income taxes.
The government’s allocative role in our setup is the provision of public con-
sumption services that augment household’s utility and public investment
that enhances public capital entering the firm’s production function. When
modelling feedback policy, we allow public consumption and investment to
respond endogenously to the cyclical state of the economy measured by the
output gap and/or the deviation of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from a
60% target.3 When such counter-cyclical reaction is switched off, policymak-
ers make use of automatic stabilizers only. In other words, we study two of
the main responsibilities of the government, namely the stabilization of the
macroeconomy as well as the re-allocation of resources via the provision of
public goods and services.
We next subject the model to both temporary and permanent stochas-
tic productivity shocks to first understand the purely stabilizing effects on
output and debt of moving from passive to active fiscal policy. We then ex-
tend the exercise to evaluate the quantitative welfare implications of these
reductions in volatility. To conduct a general equilibrium welfare analysis,
we follow the linear quadratic approach of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Woodford (2003).
Our main findings are as follow. When the object of active fiscal policy
3Given that income tax rates change infrequently via reforms (see e.g. King and Rebelo
(1999, p. 974), due to nature of the political and legal processes involved in setting them,
they are not state contingent in our setup. Also since transfers do not play an allocative
role in our model, their share in output will remain constant.
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is to stabilize output or debt volatility, then substantial reductions in their
standard deviation can be obtained, especially with respect to output. How-
ever, there is a trade-off: when policymakers intervene to stabilize output
(resp. debt), this is achieved at the cost of destabilizing public debt (resp.
output). Also, when we use public consumption as a policy instrument, the
effects are higher in magnitude than when we employ government investment.
Further, the cross-country results suggest that the direct stabilizing effects
increase with the degree of real wage rigidity.
But, even when there are substantial reductions in the standard deviation
of individual variables as we move from passive to active policy, these dif-
ferences are translated into very small gains in terms of general equilibrium
welfare. This is a robust result and applies across policy instruments and the
size or duration of shocks. This mainly happens because “stabilizing one tar-
get destabilizes another” so that net effects are negligible (stabilization takes
place via non lump-sum policy instruments so it always has some resource
and welfare implications).
Nevertheless, within the world of small welfare effects, it is worth report-
ing the following. When real wage rigidity is relatively low (like in Germany
and the UK), counter-cyclical output stabilizing policy plays its expected,
welfare-enhancing role. On the other hand, the same policy hurts the aggre-
gate economy when real wage rigidity is relatively high (like in France). To
understand this seemingly paradoxical result recall that real wage rigidity
means that current allocations and prices depend myopically on their lagged
values. When this dependence is high, so that the current state of the econ-
omy matters little, it is not a good idea to absorb output fluctuations by
varying the policy instruments. This simply deteriorates the myopic depen-
dence on the past. In other words, in a sclerotic economy, exposing the econ-
omy to the current cyclical real situation is welfare enhancing. Following the
same logic, reaction to a public debt target is deteriorating (resp. improving)
for countries with relatively flexible (resp. sclerotic) labour markers. This is
because debt stabilization comes at the cost of higher output volatility; the
latter is beneficial only for countries with relatively rigid labour markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 set out
the theoretical and parameterized models while sections 4 and 5 contain the
results and conclusions respectively. Details pertaining to the steady-state,
the linearized system, model solution and evaluation, and welfare analysis,
are contained in Appendices A-D respectively.
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2 The Theoretical Model
The DSGE model we develop below is populated by a large number of
identical infinitely-lived private agents (households and firms). The gov-
ernment imposes distorting taxes to finance public consumption, investment
and transfers. The government’s policy instruments can follow feedback rules
which depend on both exogenous factors and the endogenous state of the
economy. We allow for the well-known persistence of macroeconomic vari-
ables by including capital adjustment costs and real wage rigidity.
2.1 Households
There is a large number of identical households indexed by the superscript h,
where h = 1, 2, ...Nt. The population size at time t is Nt = nt, where n ≥ 1
is a constant rate of growth. The preferences of the representative household
are given by the following time-separable utility function:
E0
∞X
t=0
βtU
¡
Cht , L
h
t , G
c
t
¢
(1)
where E0 is the expectations operator; Cht is private consumption of house-
hold h at time t; Lht is the leisure time of household h at time t; G
c
t is average
(per household) consumption services provided by the government at time
t; and 0 < β < 1 is the subjective rate of time preference. The household
divides its time endowment between leisure and work so that Lht +H
h
t = 1.
The instantaneous utility function is increasing in its three arguments,
concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. For simplicity we use the following
log-linear form for utility:
Ut = lnC
h
t + µ ln(1−Hht ) + ν lnG
c
t (2)
where, (µ, ν) > 0 are the weights given to leisure and public consumption
respectively relative to private consumption.
Each household can save in the form of capital, Iht , and government bonds,
Dht . It receives interest income, r
k
tK
h
t , from accumulated capital and r
b
tB
h
t
from accumulated bonds, where rkt and r
b
t are the gross returns to capital
and bonds respectively. Labor augmenting technology progress at time t is
Zt = z
t, where z ≥ 1 is a constant growth rate. Given Zt, the household
receives labor income, wtztHht , per unit of effective time worked. Finally, the
household receives dividends paid by firms, Πht , and average (per household)
transfers paid by the government, G
t
t. Accordingly, the budget constraint of
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the household is:
Cht + I
h
t +D
h
t = (1− τ yt )(rktKht + wtztHht +Πht + rbtBht ) +G
t
t (3)
where is 0 < τ yt < 1 is the rate of income tax at t. Private holdings of govern-
ment bonds and capital grow according to the following evolution equations:
Bht+1 = B
h
t +D
h
t (4)
and
Kht+1 = (1− δp)Kht + Iht −
αp
2
µ
Iht
Kht
− I
h
Kh
¶2
Kht (5)
where 0 ≤ δp ≤ 1 is a constant depreciation rate, αp ≥ 0 captures internal
adjustment costs on gross investment, and Ih and Kh are the steady-state
values of equilibrium investment and capital stock respectively. In common
with the RBC literature, adjustment costs will be zero in the long run.
Households act competitively by taking market prices, policy variables
and aggregate outcomes as given. Thus, each household chooses {Cht , Hht ,
Lht , I
h
t , D
h
t , K
h
t+1, B
h
t+1}∞t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (2)−(5), the restriction
Lht +H
h
t = 1 and initial conditions for K
h
0 and B
h
0 . The first-order conditions
include the constraints (3) − (5), the optimality condition for labor supply,
(6a), and the Euler-equations for private capital and government bonds (6b−
6c):
wt =
µCht
(1−Hht )(1− τ yt )zt
≡MRSt (6a)
1
Cht
= βEt
∙
Zkt+1
µ
1
Cht+1
¶¸
(6b)µ
1
Cht
¶
= βEt
∙
Zbt+1
µ
1
Cht+1
¶¸
(6c)
where we define eIht ≡ IhtKht − I
h
Kh
,
Zkt+1 ≡
h
1− αpeIht i
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¡
1− τ yt+1
¢
rkt+1 +
1− δp + αpeIht+1 ³ Iht+1Kht+1´− αp2 ³eIht+1´2
1− αpeIht+1
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
and
Zbt+1 ≡ 1 +
¡
1− τ yt+1
¢
rbt+1.
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2.2 Firms
There is a large number of identical firms indexed by the superscript f ,
where f = 1, 2, ...Nt.4 The representative firm produces a homogeneous final
product, Y ft , by using private capital, K
f
t , private labor, H
f
t , and average
(per firm) public capital, K
g
t . The production function of the firm takes the
form:
Y ft = At
³
Kft
´α1 ³
ztHft
´α2 ¡
K
g
t
¢1−α1−α2 (7a)
where At is exogenous stochastic productivity (whose motion is specified
below) and 0 < α1,α2 < 1 are the productivity of private capital and labor
respectively. We follow e.g. Lansing (1998) by assuming CRS in the three
factors.
Firms act competitively by taking market prices, policy variables and ag-
gregate outcomes as given. Thus, each firm chooses Kft and H
f
t to maximize
Πft ≡ (1− τ st)Y ft − rktKft − wtztHft (7b)
where −1 < τ st < 0 denotes an output subsidy and vice-versa for 0 <
τ st < 1.
5 The returns to capital and labor are given by:
rkt =
α1 (1− τ st)Y ft
Kft
(7c)
wt =
α2 (1− τ st)Y ft
ztHft
. (7d)
2.3 Wage setting
To avoid further complicating the model but to also help it replicate the
stylized facts in Europe regarding inertia in wage adjustment, we follow the
setup employed in Blanchard and Galí (2005). In particular, we assume that:
wt = (wt−1)
η (MRSt)
1−η (8)
where 0 ≤ η ≤ 0 measures the degree of wage sluggishness and MRSt is
given by (6a). This specification has the following advantages (i) if η = 0 then
the standard neoclassical model obtains; (ii) in the steady-state, i.e. when
wt = wt−1 = w, it follows that again w = MRS; and (iii) as pointed out in
4For simplicity we assume that the number of firms equals the number of households
in each period.
5This tax will only be used to conduct our welfare analysis below (see subsection 6.4.4
for details). Having this in mind, it will suffice to use a flat rate over time, i.e. τ st ≡ τ s0.
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Blanchard and Galí (2005), this ad hoc relation is consistent with a number
of possible sources of rigidity in European labor markets, e.g. institutional,
legal and socio-political rigidities and safety nets, etc..
2.4 Government
The government budget constraint at t is:
Gct +G
i
t +G
t
t +
¡
1 + rbt
¢
Bt
= Bt+1 + τ
y
t
NtX
h=1
¡
rktK
h
t + wtz
tHht +Π
h
t + r
b
tBt
¢
+ τ st
NtX
f=1
Y ft (9a)
where Gct , G
i
t, G
t
t are respectively total government consumption, total gov-
ernment investment and total government transfers at time t, and Bt+1 is the
end-of-period total stock of bonds issued by the government. Government
investment, Git, is used to augment the stock of public capital, K
g
t , whose
motion is given by:
Kgt+1 = (1− δg)Kgt +Git (9b)
where 0 ≤ δg ≤ 1 is a constant depreciation rate.
2.5 Decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the paths of technology, population and labor augmenting technical
progress {At, Nt, Zt}∞t=0, the economic policy instruments {Gct , Git, Gtt, τ yt ,
τ st}∞t=0 and initial conditions for the state variables {B0, K0, Kg0 , w0}, a de-
centralized competitive equilibrium (DCE) is defined to be a sequence of al-
locations {Yt, Ct, It, Ht, Kt+1, Kgt+1, Bt+1}∞t=0 and prices
©
rkt , r
b
t , wt
ª∞
t=0
such
that: (i) households maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; (iii) the
capital, labor, and bond markets clear, i.e.
NtP
h=1
Kht =
NtP
h=1
Kft ;
NtP
h=1
Hht =
NtP
h=1
Hft ;
NtP
h=1
Bht = Bt, respectively; and (iv) the government budget constraint given
by (9a) and the motion in (9b) are satisfied. Note that market clearing values
will be denoted by letters without the superscript h and f .
We next transform the relevant aggregate quantities to stationary vari-
ables by defining xt = Xt/ (nz)
t, where Xt ≡ (Yt, Ct, It, Kt, Kgt , Bt, Gct , Git,
Gtt). An exception is ht = Ht/n
t. Accordingly, small letters denote quantities
in per capita and efficiency units. Also note that at ≡ At. Our CE derived in
the previous sub-sections can now be rewritten in stationary form as follows:
yt = at (kt)
α1 (ht)
α2 (kgt )
1−α1−α2 (10a)
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yt = ct + it + g
c
t + g
i
t (10b)
nzkt+1 = (1− δp) kt + it −
αp
2
³eit´2 kt (10c)
wt = (wt−1)
η
µ
µct
(1− ht)(1− τ yt )
¶1−η
(10d)
1
ct
=
β
nz
Et
∙
zkt+1
µ
1
ct+1
¶¸
(10e)
1
ct
=
β
nz
Et
∙
zbt+1
µ
1
ct+1
¶¸
(10f)
nzkgt+1 = (1− δg) kgt + git (10g)
gct + g
i
t + g
t
t +
¡
1 + rbt
¢
bt (10h)
= nzbt+1 + τ
y
t
£
yt + r
b
tbt
¤
+ τ styt
where the stationary returns to capital and labor are:
rkt =
α1 (1− τ st) yt
kt
, (10i)
wt =
α2 (1− τ st) yt
ht
(10j)
and where we have the definitions:
eit ≡ it
kt
− i
k
,
zkt+1 ≡
h
1− αpeiti
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¡
1− τ yt+1
¢
rkt+1 +
1− δp + αpeit+1 ³ it+1kt+1´− αp2 ³eit+1´2
1− αpeit+1
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
,
and
zbt+1 ≡ 1 +
¡
1− τ yt+1
¢
rbt+1.
In other words, the stationary DCE is defined by the above system of
ten nonlinear stochastic difference equations in {yt, ct, it, ht, kt+1, kgt+1, rbt ,
bt+1, wt, r
k
t }∞t=0 for given paths of technology, {at}∞t=0 and the independent
policy instruments, {gct , gtt, git, τ yt , τ st}∞t=0 whose evolution is explained in the
next sub-section.
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2.6 The motion of technology and fiscal policy instru-
ments
Following most of the RBC literature, we assume that the stochastic process
determining at is an exponential first-order Markov process
at = a
(1−ρa)
0 a
ρa
t−1e
εt (11a)
where a0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < ρa < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
εt ∼ iid(0,σ2) are the random shocks to productivity.
Following e.g. Aloi et al. (2003), Christiano and Harrison (1999) and
Guo and Lansing (1998), the policy instrument rates pt = [gct/yt g
i
t/yt g
t
t/yt
τ yt τ
s
t ]
0 can follow feedback rules of the form
pt = ept (ft/f)γ (11b)
where ept is the exogenous or non-state contingent part of the policy instru-
ment rate and (ft/f)
γ is its feedback or state contingent component. We
assume that ft ≡
h
yt
bt
yt
i0
and hence f =
h
y b
y
i0
. Thus the authorities can
react to deviations of output and the public debt-to-output ratio from their
steady-state values. Finally, γ is a vector of feedback policy coefficients that
can be positive, negative or zero depending on whether the policy instrument
rate is used pro-cyclically, counter-cyclically or a-cyclically.
Thus our setup can allow for policy reactions to the output gap, which
is the most common form of counter-cyclical policy, and to public debt to
output ratio relative to the 60% value implicitly required by the SGP (see
Appendix A for details).6 The former is an indicator of economic activity
and a flow variable. The latter is an indicator of public finances and a stock
variable. Note that our feedback policy rules are also in accordance with
Tanzi’s suggestion (Tanzi, CESifo Forum, 3/2005, p. 64) that “counter-
cyclical fiscal policy should not be abandoned in depressions and it could be
tried in milder slowdowns when the fiscal accounts of a country are in good
initial conditions”. Note finally that, despite the recent loosening of the SGP,
national policymakers continue to take into account the fiscal accounts and
imbalances.
6The CESifo DICE Report, 2/2004, pp. 85-86, points to other possible fiscal rules, not
considered in this study but which are used or being considered in various OECD countries.
For instance, there can also be ceilings on different items of government spending, or golden
rules stating that net government borrowing should not exceed net public investment.
Also, in the EU countries, there is the additional 3% of GDP ceiling on net government
borrowing.
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For the reasons discussed so far (see footnotes 3 and 5 above), we assume
that gtt/yt, τ
y
t , and τ
s
t do not contain a state contingent component. Hence
the relevant elements of vector γ are zero. We also assume that the exogenous
part of all instruments except τ yt is constant.
7 The above discussion implies
the following specific policy rules
gct
yt
= gc0
µ
yt
y
¶γgy µyt/bt
y/b
¶γgb
(12a)
git
yt
= gi0
µ
yt
y
¶γiy µyt/bt
y/b
¶γib
(12b)
gtt
yt
= gt0 (12c)
τ yt = (τ
y
0)
(1−ρτ ) ¡τ yt−1¢ρτ (12d)
where the three constants gc0, g
i
0, g
t
0 represent the steady-state shares of each
component of public spending to output and τ y0 is the steady-state direct
tax.8
The stationary long-run DCE and its linearized version are presented in
Appendices A and B respectively.
3 The Parameterized Model
The model’s structural parameters relating to preferences, production and
capital accumulation are next calibrated using annual data for France, Ger-
many and the United Kingdom from 1970-2005. The individual country data
are obtained from the OECD, IMF and ECFIN. The OECD databases in-
clude: (i) Main Economic Indicators (MEI); (ii) Economic Outlook (EO);
and (iii) International Sectoral Database (ISDB). The IMF data is from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. Effective tax rates were
obtained from ECFIN. Finally, to obtain empirical support for our mod-
elling choices, we assess the fit of our calibrated DCE models using Watson’s
(1993) root mean square approximation error (RMSAE) measure.
7For reasons which will become clear when we develop the welfare analysis below, we
allow direct taxes to follow a deterministic AR(1) process.
8As mentioned in footnote (5) the subsidy rate, τst is equal to its long-run steady state,
τs0 for all t, see subsection 6.4.4 for its determination.
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3.1 Calibrated parameters
The parameters of our model and their calibrated values are listed in Table 1.
Average labour’s share, α2, is obtained directly from the ISDB dataset. An
approximate value across our 3-countries of 0.6 has also been used by Smets
andWouters (2003) for the Euro Area aggregate. Private and public capital’s
shares, α1 and (1− α1 − α2) respectively, are obtained by decomposing the
implied aggregate capital share into private and public shares using average
private and public investment shares from the EO database. Our implied
values for the productivity of public capital, 0.053, 0.046, 0.015 for Germany,
France and the UK respectively, are similar in magnitude to those found in
for example, Baxter and King (1993) and Lansing (1998) for the U.S..
Table 1: Parameter Values
parameter Ger Fra Gbr definition
0 < α1 < 1 0.36 0.38 0.38 productivity of private capital
0 < α2 < 1 0.59 0.58 0.60 productivity of labor
αp ≥ 0 2.00 2.00 2.00 adjustment costs on private capital
0 < β < 1 0.96 0.97 0.98 rate of time preference
0 ≤ δg ≤ 1 0.10 0.10 0.10 depreciation rate on public capital
0 ≤ δp ≤ 1 0.10 0.10 0.10 depreciation rate on private capital
0 ≤ η ≤ 1 0.80 0.88 0.79 degree of real wage rigidity
µ > 0 2.11 2.09 1.88 leisure weight in utility
n ≥ 1 1.011 1.007 1.003 population growth
ν > 0 0.10 0.10 0.10 public consumption weight in utility
0 ≤ τ y0 < 1 0.31 0.30 0.29 direct tax rate
z ≥ 1 1.016 1.010 1.021 labor augmenting tech progress
Since we do not have data pertaining to capital adjustment costs and
since our specification of these costs is based on Canova (2002), we follow this
study and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002) and set αp = 2 for all countries.
Note that in the absence of data, we adopt the convention of fixing the same
parameter value across countries in order not to bias the subsequent results
and analysis. In other words, when the appropriate data exists, we let it
define cross-country differences in economic structure.
Given the relationship between the gross real rate of interest and the
discount rate, i.e. (1 + r) = 1β , we use MEI data on ex-post real interest
rates to imply the values of β reported in Table 1. Given the lack of reliable
depreciation rate data, following Smets andWouters (2003) we set the private
to 10% per annum. We also applied the same rate to public capital. In all
cases this contributed to producing reasonable private and public capital to
12
output ratios, e.g. private: 2.15, 2.50, 2.57 and public: 0.32, 0.31, 0.10 for
Germany, France, and the UK respectively.
To calculate the wage persistence parameter, η, we obtain real wage data
from the MEI and IFS databases. We then take logs of the data and use the
Kalman Filter to estimate simple AR(1) models including a fixed η on the
lagged wage and a time-varying constant term assuming that its process is
I(1). The latter provides a rough proxy for the MRSt term in equation (8).
Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we use data on average hours
worked, H, to calculate the leisure weight in utility, µ. We employ the simple
transformation 1−h
h
to calculate µ, where h = H/(7 ∗ 14 ∗ 52) is the average
share of the total time endowment allocated to work and H is obtained from
the EO database. The normalization of H to obtain h follows Jorgenson
(1995) and Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995).9 Our implied leisure weights
reported in Table 1 are similar in magnitude to those found in other calibra-
tion studies, see e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Chari et al. (1995) for
the U.S..
The gross rates of growth of the population, n, and labour productiv-
ity, z, are calculated using IFS and ISDB data respectively. Given the lack
of relevant data, we follow the study by Baier and Glomm (2001), and set
the relative weight of public consumption services at ν = 0.1 for all coun-
tries. Finally we obtained the direct tax rates, τ y0, from the ECFIN paper
by Martinez-Mongay (2000). The rates reported in Table 1 are the weighted
average of the effective tax rates on gross capital and employed labour.
3.2 Parameters for technology and the policy rules
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider both temporary and permanent
shocks to productivity across countries. Given that the resulting volatility in
macroeconomic aggregates depends on the size of the shock and the degree of
persistence in the process driving technology, we normalize these parameters
across countries. To understand the differential effects on volatility, we fix
ρa at 0.95 and shock the standard deviation of technology, σa, by 1 and 5%.
We then repeat this exercise when ρa is fixed at unity.
We now turn to the reaction coefficients in the fiscal policy instruments
(see equations 12a, b). Based on the empirical finding of Galí and Perotti
(2005) and Clayes (2006) and the lack of robust estimates, we will employ
a range running from 0 to 0.2 for each country. Finally the AR parameters
9The assumption is that 10 hours per day are necessary for physical needs “physiological
time” and therefore do not count in the total hours available for the labor-leisure choice,
i.e. the remaining 14 hours.
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for the effective tax rates, ρτ in (12d) were obtained using the ECFIN data.
The estimates of ρτ for France, Germany and the UK respectively are: 0.944,
0.74 and 0.71 and are all significant at the 1% level.
3.3 Watson measure
The Watson (1993) method, used to obtain a measure of model fit below,
allows us to compare characteristics of the actual data corresponding to our
model with the data generated by our model. Watson points out, in the
context of models which are calibrated, that it is important not to view the
economic model as the data generating process, but rather as an approxima-
tion to it. The essence of Watson’s approach is to determine the size of the
stochastic error necessary to reconcile the model-generated covariances with
the sample covariances.
To briefly illustrate the main points of the approach consider an (n× 1)
vector of stationary variables xt explained by an economic model, and its
empirical counterpart yt, with covariance generating functions Gx(z) and
Gy(z) respectively. Watson’s method poses the following question, “How
much error would have to be added to xt so that the autocovariances of
xt + ut are equal to the autocovariances of yt” (see Watson, 1993, p.1015).
This setup implies that the difference between the model and the data can
be expressed as ut = yt − xt or Gu(z) = Gy(z) +Gx(z)−Gyx(z)−Gxy(z)
where Gu(z) is the covariance generating function for the difference between
the model and the data.
To obtain the various covariance functions requires that we (i) estimate
Gy(z) from the data; (ii) calculateGx(z) from the model; (iii) chooseGxy(z)
to minimize the variance of ut, subject to the constraint that Gxy(z) is pos-
itive semi-definite.10 With these calculations in place, we can then derive
Watson’s RMSAE. More specifically we compute the ratio of the autospec-
trum of uj to the autospectrum of yj11
Rj(ω) =
R π
−πGu(exp (−iω))jjdωR π
π Gy(exp (−iω))jjdω
. (13)
This measure is conceptually similar to the unexplained variance of a
standard regression. Although it is not bounded between zero and unity,
smaller values do imply a better model approximation to the data that larger
10In other words, the spectrum, Fxy(ω), is positive semidefinite.
11The spectrum is given as F(ω) = 12πG (exp(−iω)) (see, Hamilton, 1994, Sections 3.6,
10.3).
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ones. Finally, note that in all the results reported below, for any variable j,
we use the entire range of the spectrum, i.e. [−π π].12
3.4 Model Fit
Table 2 compares the fit of our calibrated DCE model under passive policy
with a baseline model under varying assumptions regarding model structure.
We take the baseline RBC model (with government) is defined as a special
case of our model without capital adjustment costs and real wage rigidity
(i.e. η = αp = 0). To understand the implications in terms of model fit,
we move from this baseline to our full DCE model by adding back in the
mechanisms which generate persistence and thus should have the effect of
capturing some of the inertia observed in the actual data.
To obtain the measures of fit reported in Table 2, the data spectra are
calculated from three VAR(1) models using annual data from 1970-2005.
Following Watson who illustrates his method using the RBC model by King,
Plosser and Rebelo (1988a, 1988b), we use consumption, investment, em-
ployment and output in the VAR.13 In addition, given the presence of public
consumption and investment in our model, in the interest of parsimony, we
add aggregate government expenditure (excluding transfers) to the VAR.
Given our short observation period, the VAR model can be made still more
parsimonious by excluding output. This is possible since we can still obtain
the spectral density matrix for the data including output via the following
transformation
U =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
wc wi wg 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
;Fy(ω) = UFc,i,g,h(ω)U0,
where wc, wi, and wg are the average output weights of the three expenditure
components calculated from the data.
To assess the statistical significance of the fit measure, we generate 1000
replications for each model (non-parametric bootstrap). Based on these repli-
cations, we obtain the empirical distribution for the fit measure given in
12Note that this measure can also be calculated at any frequency ω or between desired
ranges [ω1,ω2] . Since all variables are equally important when calculating the “goodness
of fit” measure, we weight them equally (see, e.g. Watson 1993, p. 1018). Further details
are provided in Appendix C.
13As in Watson, the data (in logs) are pre-filtered using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997)
filter (smoothing weight: 100).
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(13), which we then compare with the performance of the baseline model
(η = αp = 0). To calculate the model spectrum including output, consump-
tion, investment, government expenditure and hours of work from the full
calibrated model spectrum (11 variables), we use a (5× 11) selection matrix
E with ones in the appropriate position such that Fx(ω) = EF11×11(ω)E0.14
Table 2a: Model Fit Germany
αp = 0, η 6= 0 η = 0, αp 6= 0 αp 6= η 6= 0byt -0.007 0.034 0.033
(-0.014;0.012)∗ (0.019;0.078) (-0.029;0.090)∗bit 0.041 0.132 0.129
(0.024;0.094) (0.079;0.258) (0.080;0.253)bct 0.004 0.015 0.014
(-0.001;0.014)∗ (0.008;0.039) (0.008;0.036)bgt -0.008 0.056 0.053
(-0.021;0.026)∗ (0.032;0.122) (-0.051;0.151)∗bht 0.097 0.746 0.684
(0.085;0.106) (0.675;0.810) (0.616;0.738)
Note that the results reported in Table 2 are in percent differences from
the baseline model. Accordingly, a positive value denotes the percent im-
provement in fit across models and vice-versa for negative values. The
numbers in parentheses are the lower and upper bounds of 5% confidence
intervals. If the confidence interval includes zero, then there is not a sta-
tistically difference between that baseline model and the alternative model
considered.15
14We follow Uhlig (1999) and filter the model spectrum using the power transfer function
of the HP-filter with the same smoothing weight as the data.
15In Table 2 the starred results reveal that the model fit is not significantly better or
worse than the baseline model. In contrast the results tagged with § indicate a significantly
worse fit than the baseline model.
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Table 2b: Model Fit France
αp = 0, η 6= 0 η = 0, αp 6= 0 αp 6= η 6= 0byt -0.200 0.351 0.254
(-0.314;-0.129)§ (0.245;0.555) (0.179;0.402)bit 0.214 0.831 0.773
(0.201;0.327) (0.777;0.888) (0.722;0.827)bct 0.072 0.251 0.226
(0.044;0.156) (0.167;0.446) (0.150;0.402)bgt -0.089 0.150 0.109
(-0.178;-0.050)§ (0.093;0.304) (0.066;0.224)bht 0.067 0.843 0.712
(0.052;0.069) (0.823;0.858) (0.696;0.725)
Table 2c: Model Fit UK
αp = 0, η 6= 0 η = 0, αp 6= 0 αp 6= η 6= 0byt 0.018 0.028 0.044
(-0.015;0.025)∗ (0.016;0.090) (0.012;0.106)bit 0.003 0.011 0.011
(0.002;0.009) (0.006;0.028) (0.006;0.028)bct 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.001;0.004) (0.003;0.012) (0.002;0.011)bgt 0.012 0.019 0.030
(-0.007;0.016)∗ (0.011;0.061) (0.008;0.078)bht 0.019 0.135 0.126
(0.008;0.072) (0.075;0.324) (0.070;0.308)
Overall the results in Table 2 provide an interesting picture and empirical
support for several of our key modelling choices. First, the presence of both
real wage rigidity and capital adjustment costs improves the model fit for all
countries and all variables with only two significant exceptions (for output
and government spending in France when αp = 0). Second, capital adjust-
ment costs appear to provide greater marginal improvements in fit than real
wage rigidity for all countries and for all variables. Finally, there is a signifi-
cant improvement in fit for the full model for all countries and all variables
with only two exceptions (output and government spending in Germany are
not significantly different from the baseline).
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4 Fiscal stabilization
Consistent with the current debates in Europe focusing on the need and im-
pact of countercyclical fiscal stabilization policy, we first examine the relative
ability of public consumption and investment to stabilize output and debt.
We will then turn to a formal welfare assessment of the volatility implications
of these alternative outcomes.
4.1 Output and debt stabilization
The results reported in Tables 3a-c show the decrease in the variability
(shown as positive numbers) of both the output and debt gaps (measured by
their standard deviation) as we move from passive to active policy. In this
experiment, we temporarily shock aggregate productivity by 1% (reflected by
the standard deviation of productivity increasing from 0 to 0.01). We then
calculate the standard deviations of the output and debt gaps under passive
and active policy over 3 and 5 year horizons. Active policy here means that
we switch-on one policy instrument and one policy target at a time for two
different policy reaction coefficients, i.e. 0.1 and 0.2. By direct effect, we
mean the effect on the policy target that the government reacts to, while by
indirect, we mean the side effect on the other policy target.
For example, in Table 3a for Germany, a government consumption reac-
tion coefficient of 0.1 to the output gap reduces the standard deviation of the
latter by 24.6% over the 3 year horizon. The indirect effect of this policy on
the standard deviation of the debt gap is -25.2% meaning that, when govern-
ment consumption is used to stabilize the output gap, higher debt volatility
ensues. This is not unexpected since an increase in government spending
raises debt requirements. When government consumption is used to react to
the deviation of the current public debt-to-GDP ratio from its reference 60%
rate, the corresponding fall in the standard deviation of the debt gap is only
1%, while output variability rises by 2.5%. In other words, stabilization of
one target comes at the cost of destabilizing the other target. This applies
to all the indirect effects as indicated by the negative values. Note that the
indirect destabilizing effect from output to debt is stronger than the direct
stabilizing effect from debt to debt. For instance, in the case we discussed
above, the absolute value of -25.2% exceeds 1%. Also note that the indirect
destabilizing effect from debt to output is stronger than the direct stabilizing
effect from debt to debt.
We can therefore draw three broad messages from the cross-country evi-
dence presented in Table 3:
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• First, the direct effect of fiscal intervention is stabilizing but the indirect
effect is destabilizing with respect to the chosen targets. Thus, there is
a trade-off. The effects of reaction to the output gap are much bigger
in magnitude than the effects of reaction to the debt gap. Specifically,
when policymakers counter-cyclically respond to the output gap, there
are big stabilizing effects on output as well as big destabilizing effects
on debt. When policymakers counter-cyclically respond to the debt
gap, there are small stabilizing effects on debt and small destabilizing
effects on output, where the latter exceed the former.
• Second, the direct stabilizing effects are higher in France than in Ger-
many and the UK, due to higher real wage rigidity in France.
• Third, the stabilizing effects of public consumption are stronger than
those of public investment. One reason is simply that the former is
a much larger share of GDP than the latter so that, either as an au-
tomatic stabilizer or as an instrument of active policy, it has a bigger
impact. Also, when the aim is stabilization, it seems it is better to use
policy instruments (like government consumption) that do not directly
affect the supply side of the economy. All this provides support for
the argument that public finance stabilization should take place via
reductions in government consumption.
Table 3a: 0utput and debt stabilization: Germany
% ch. σ(byt) % ch. σ(bbt)
react. coef. 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
3-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.246 0.384 0.010 0.005
pub. invst. 0.101 0.186 0.004 0.008
3-yr indirect
pub. cons. -0.025 -0.038 -0.252 -0.511
pub. invst. -0.010 -0.019 -0.090 -0.180
5-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.146 0.242 0.004 -0.008
pub. invs. 0.060 0.111 0.002 0.002
5-yr indirect
pub. invs. -0.015 -0.022 -0.237 -0.477
pub. cons. -0.006 -0.012 -0.084 -0.168
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Table 3b: 0utput and debt stabilization: France
% ch. σ(byt) % ch. σ(bbt)
react. coef. 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
3-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.376 0.283 0.013 0.015
pub. invst. 0.199 0.330 0.006 0.011
3-yr indirect
pub. cons. -0.046 -0.072 -0.196 -0.418
pub. invst. -0.018 -0.036 -0.073 -0.150
5-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.248 0.347 0.006 0.001
pub. invs. 0.115 0.204 0.003 0.005
5-yr indirect
pub. cons. -0.025 -0.040 -0.183 -0.385
pub. invs. -0.010 -0.020 -0.068 -0.139
Table 3c: 0utput and debt stabilization: UK
% ch. σ(byt) % ch. σ(bbt)
react. coef. 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
3-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.174 0.300 0.006 0.006
pub. invst. 0.040 0.077 0.001 0.003
3-yr indirect
pub. cons. -0.014 -0.024 -0.169 -0.341
pub. invst. -0.003 -0.006 -0.035 -0.069
5-yr direct
pub. cons. 0.102 0.180 0.002 -0.002
pub. invs. 0.023 0.045 0.001 0.001
5-yr indirect
pub. cons. -0.008 -0.014 -0.160 -0.321
pub. invs. -0.002 -0.004 -0.033 -0.065
4.2 Welfare analysis
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003), we now
turn to a formal welfare ranking of the two policy regimes (i.e. passive
versus active) to determine whether policymakers should act or not and, if
so, by how much and to which state variable. To carry out this analysis, we
first solve for a compensating consumption supplement that makes welfare
equal in the two policy regimes (see, e.g. Lucas (1990)). The value of this
20
supplement will provide us with a measure of the welfare difference between
the two policy regimes expressed as a share of consumption. To calculate
this measure requires a measure of aggregate utility under the various states
considered (see Appendix D for a full derivation). With these in place, we
can then subject the model to a series of stochastic productivity shocks (i.e.
1000 per experiment) to understand the quantitative welfare implications of
moving from passive to active fiscal policy. In light of either the necessary
condition for fiscal solvency or Tinbergen’s rule, we evaluate one instrument
and one target at a time.
4.2.1 Compensating consumption supplement
Let W p denote the intertemporal expected discounted lifetime utility that
the household enjoys under passive policy, and W a denote the same under
active policy. Equations (1) and (2) imply (see D.1 in Appendix D)
W j ≡ E0
∞X
t=0
βt
£
ln cjt + µ ln
¡
1− hjt
¢
+ ν ln
¡
gc,jt
¢
+ (1 + ν) lnZt
¤
(14)
where the superscripts j = p, a denote passive and active policy respec-
tively.
Working as in Lucas (1990), we next let ξcpt denote a compensating con-
sumption supplement at each date under the active policy regime that is
proportional by ξ to private consumption under the passive reference regime
and makes W a =W p. Thus,
W a = E0
∞X
t=0
βt [ln {(1 + ξ) cpt}+ µ ln (1− hpt ) + ν ln (gc,pt ) + (1 + ν) lnZt] .
The difference between welfare in the active and passive cases is then
given by:
W a −W p = (1 + ξ)
∞X
t=0
βt =
ln (1 + ξ)
(1− β)
or
ξ =
h
e(1−β)(W
a
t −W
p
t ) − 1
i
× 100. (15)
Therefore, if ξ > 0, there is a welfare gain of moving from passive to
active policy and vice versa for ξ < 0.
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4.2.2 Aggregate welfare
To obtain estimates of W a and W p and hence ξ, we start by deriving the
second-order approximation of the within-period aggregate utility, the model’s
constraints, and in turn the lifetime expected utility. However, equation
(D.10) in Appendix D shows that this second-order approximation contains
linear deviations terms.16 The presence of these terms implies that a second-
order approximation to expected utility is not consistent with a first-order
one to the equilibrium solution of the endogenous variables in Appendix B
(see e.g. Woodford (2003) pp. 383-7). In other words, since we have used
a linear approximation to the model, we need an approximation to expected
utility that is purely quadratic.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003, ch. 6),
we derive a quadratic approximation to expected utility that includes no
linear terms of this kind by ensuring that the long-run equilibrium around
which we have approximated is socially optimal, i.e. it reproduces the real
allocations of the social planner in the long run. As we show in Appendix D,
this effectively eliminates the problematic linear terms in the approximate
welfare function. In other words, we derive a set of policy rules for our long-
run DCE economy so as the latter’s allocations mimic those of the social
planner. A comparison of the long-run social planner’s solution with the long-
run DCE solution reveals that this can happen when the size of the output
subsidy offsets the distortion resulting from the income tax (see Appendix
D and in particular equation (D.28a)). It is important to point out that, in
the long run of our economy, distortions arise only from the side of policy
and the use of income taxes in particular.17 We therefore find it natural
to undo the (income tax) policy distortion by appropriately using another
policy instrument.18
Based on the above, we will assess the welfare implications of passive
16More specifically, the linear terms are in hours worked, government consumption and
the two capital stocks.
17Note that due to the wage setting equation (8), there are no distortions from the
market side in the long run.
18The same procedure has been used in various forms by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) and more recently Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) who use the output subsidy to
undo the distortion resulting from monopolistic power in the long run. An alternative way
of attaining an approximation, if one wants to work with a distorted long run, is to solve for
a second-order approximation to the complete system of the endogenous variables and then
use this solution to evaluate a quadratic approximation to expected utility. Yet another
alternative is to use a second-order approximation to the aggregate supply relationship
only to eliminate the linear terms in the second-order approximate welfare measure (see,
e.g Benigno and Woodford (2004) for a review of alternative methods). Here we prefer to
keep the convenience of a linear-quadratic setup for the comparison of policy regimes.
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versus active (j = p, a) fiscal policy using the following quadratic welfare
function (see equation (D.29) in Appendix 4)
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtU j,st
#
(16)
' t.i.p.+E0[
∞X
t=0
βt(a∗5(bkjt+1 − bkjt )2 + a∗6(bkg,jt+1 − bkg,jt )2 − a∗7 ¡bcjt¢2
−a∗8(bijt)2 − a∗9 ¡bgc,jt ¢2 − a∗10(bgi,jt )2 + a∗11 ¡byjt ¢2 − a∗12(bhjt)2)]
where the s superscript denotes the second-order approximation to utility
and t.i.p. denotes the terms independent of policy, e.g.
t.i.p. ≡ U
1− β + a
∗
1
bk0 + a∗2bkg0 + ∞X
t=0
βt
h
a∗3 bZt + a∗4bati ;
a∗1 =
nzk∗
c∗β , a
∗
2 =
nzkg∗
c∗β , a
∗
3 = 1 + ν, a
∗
4 =
y∗
c∗ ,
a∗5 =
nz(1−δp)k2∗
2c∗i∗ , a
∗
6 =
nz(1−δg)(kg∗)2
2c∗gi∗ , a
∗
7 =
1
2
, a∗8 =
i∗
2c∗ ,
a∗9 =
gc∗
2c∗ , a
∗
10 =
gi∗
2c∗ , a
∗
11 =
y∗
2c∗ , a
∗
12 =
µh∗
2(1−h∗)2 .
and a ∗ superscript on the steady-state endogenous variables denotes the
DCE solution that replicates the social planner’s.19
It is worth noting that, in contrast to Woodford (2003)-type research,
due to the presence of private and public capital accumulation in our model,
the welfare function given by (16) appears to depend both positively and
negatively on the variances of the relevant variables. The net effect of these
competing effects should clearly be negative in the passive case. While (16)
is too complicated to sign analytically, the results in Table 4 provide nu-
meric evidence which shows that an increase in uncertainty (reflected by σ2
increasing from 0 to 0.01 and from 0.01 to 0.05) leads to the expected rise in
the net variance and hence a fall in aggregate welfare.20
Table 4: Net Variance (passive case)
σ2 0.01 0.05
Germany -0.0003 -0.0074
France -0.0005 -0.0135
UK -0.0002 -0.0040
19Following the literature we calculate discounted lifetime utility over a 400 year horizon
here.
20As above, we calculate discounted lifetime utility over 400 years and shock productivity
1000 times. Also we do not include the t.i.p terms in these calculations.
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4.2.3 General Equilibrium Welfare (active versus passive policy)
Figures 1 and 2 are calculated for productivity shocks of 1% and 5% respec-
tively.21 Before more detailed discussion below, the following two observa-
tions from these Figures are noteworthy:
• First, even when there are substantial differences in the standard devi-
ation of output between active and passive policy as evidenced in Table
3, these differences are translated into small differences in general equi-
librium welfare.22 This finding applies across policy instruments, size,
and duration of the shocks.
• Second, consistent with the positive results of Table 3, counter-cyclical
responses via government consumption have bigger welfare implications
than similar responses via government investment.
[Figures 1-2 about here]
Some possible explanations of the first point include: (i) stabilization of
output via the counter-cyclical use/response of policy instruments unavoid-
ably increases the volatility of the latter, and this mitigates the welfare gains
from active policy in general equilibrium; (ii) as shown in Table 3, debt sta-
bilization comes at the cost of output volatility and this is bad for welfare,
see e.g. the second row of the figures for Germany and the UK.23
Keeping in mind the above observations, let us now consider the welfare
implications of counter-cyclical policy when the economy is hit by a 1%
permanent productivity shock. We start with a counter-cyclical reaction to
21Given that the effects of temporary shocks are qualitatively similar to the permanent
case but smaller, depending on the size of the AR coefficient, they are not reported here
but are available on request.
22Although the welfare differences are small, they appear consistent with the findings
of other studies. For instance, when Lucas (1990) uses the same measure of welfare as in
equation (15) above, he finds the welfare gain (of moving from the existing tax structure in
the US to a Ramsey structure with zero capital income taxation) to be around 1-2 percent
of consumption. Here, our welfare difference between active and passive (say third- to
second-best) is clearly much smaller. On the other hand, the difference between active
and passive policy should be expected to be far less dramatic than the difference between
the two tax structures (say second- to first-best) compared by Lucas (i.e. from 36% to 0%
tax rates). It also appears that our use of an log-linear utility function is not expected to
produce an overly strong downward bias in size of the welfare effects. For example, Chari
et al. (1994) report: ”For the model with log utility, the welfare gains (from a switch to
zero Ramsey tax rate) are 1% of consumption; for the model with high risk aversion, the
gains are 1.3%”.
23We will return to the explanation for France below.
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the output gap. The first row of Figure 1 reveals that there are small benefits
from active policy in Germany and the UK, while output stabilization reduces
welfare for France. Thus, the policy lesson is “Do not intervene to stabilize
the output gap when real wage rigidity is high. When real wage rigidity is
low, there are small benefits from output stabilization”.
We continue with counter-cyclical reaction to the debt target. Inspection
of the second row of Figure 1 reveals that there are very small welfare losses in
Germany and practically zero effects in the UK, while France clearly benefits
from debt stabilization. Thus, the policy lesson is “Intervene to stabilize
the public debt when real wage rigidity is high. When real wage rigidity is
low, welfare differences are negligible”. To understand this result, recall from
Table 3 that debt stabilization can be achieved at the cost of higher output
volatility, where the latter destabilizing effect exceeds the former stabilizing
one. In other words, in the second row of Figure 1, when debt is stabilized
and hence output is destabilized, France benefits. This is then consistent
with the results from the first row of Figure 1; namely, output stabilization
hurts France, while it is beneficial for Germany and the UK.
We can now combine results. In an economy with a relatively flexible
(resp. sclerotic) labour market, policy intervention that reduces output fluc-
tuations is a qualitatively good (resp. bad) idea. In other words, when
real wage rigidity is relatively low, counter-cyclical output stabilizing policy
plays its expected, welfare-enhancing role. On the other hand, the same pol-
icy hurts the aggregate economy when real wage rigidity is relatively high (as
in France). To understand this seemingly paradoxical result recall that real
wage rigidity means that current allocations and prices depend myopically
on their lagged values. When this dependence is high, so that the current
state of the economy matters little, it is not a good idea to absorb output
fluctuations by varying the policy instruments. This simply deteriorates the
myopic dependence on the past. In other words, in a sclerotic economy, ex-
posing the economy to the current cyclical real situation is welfare enhancing.
Following this logic, reaction to a public debt target is welfare deteriorating
(resp. beneficial) for countries with relatively flexible (resp. sclerotic) labour
markers. This is because debt stabilization comes at the cost of higher out-
put volatility; the latter is good only for countries with relatively rigid labour
markets.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we developed a DSGE model to examine the quantitative
macroeconomic implications of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the EU-3. In
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our model setup we: (i) allow fiscal policy instruments to react to two key
fundamentals, i.e. output and public debt; (ii) justify feedback policy by
assuming real wage rigidity, which is widely believed to be one of the main
scleroses in Europe; (iii) deliberately employ a minimal setup where the only
distorting effect from the part of policy is non-availability of lump-sum policy
instruments;24 (iv) study how each fiscal policy instrument, as well as the
choice between an output gap target and a public finance target, (de)stabilize
the economy, where by stabilization we mean both the internal stability of
the system and the standard deviation of macroeconomic variables when the
economy is subjected to supply shocks; (v) calculate the general equilibrium
welfare difference when moving from passive to active policy for each policy
instrument and each target.
Our findings revealed that our model was a better approximation of the
data than a standard baseline RBC model and that, in general, a model with
real wage rigidity fits better. We then used our model to investigate whether
active policy is better than passive policy in terms of the standard deviation
of output and public debt, as well as in terms of general equilibrium welfare.
While the exact quantitative answer depends on what policymakers tar-
get, the policy instrument they use, and the degree of real wage rigidity, there
is a robust result: the general equilibrium welfare gains (if any) from active
policy are negligible quantitatively. Accordingly, the simply message arising
from our welfare analysis is that much of the recent enthusiasm in Europe
for fiscal stabilization policy appears to be misplaced.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix A: Steady-state of DCE
In the absence of technology shocks, i.e. εt = 0 for all t, the economy (see
section 2.5.1) converges to its steady-state in which all of the stationary
variables are constant. In other words, for any xt, x denotes its long-run
value. This implies that a = a0, gc = gc0y, g
i = gi0y, g
t = gt0y, τ
y = τ y0,
∂It/∂Kt+1 = 1 and ∂It+1/∂Kt+1 = (δp − 1). Accordingly, expressions for
the model consistent long-run values,
¡
h, y, c, i, k, kg, b, rk, w, rb
¢
, comprised
of non-linear convolutions of the underlying structural parameters, are given
by:
h =
ω1ω2
µ+ ω1ω2
(A.1)
y =
"
a0
µ
α1β (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)
nz − β (1− δp)
¶α1
hα2
µ
gi0
nz + δg − 1
¶1−α1−α2#1/α2
(A.2)
c = ω−12 y (A.3)
i = (nz + δp − 1)
µ
α1β (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)
nz − β(1− δp)
¶
y (A.4)
k =
µ
α1β (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)
nz − β(1− δp)
¶
y (A.5)
kg =
µ
gi0
nz + δg − 1
¶
y (A.6)
b = ω3y (A.7)
rk =
α1 (1− τ s0) y
k
(A.8)
w =
α2 (1− τ s0) y
h
(A.9)
rb =
nz − β
β (1− τ y0)
(A.10)
where,
ω1 ≡ α2 (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)
ω2 ≡
nz − β(1− δp)
[nz − β (1− δp)] (1− gc0 − gi0)− (nz + δp − 1)α1β (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)
ω3 ≡
gc0 + g
i
0 + g
t
0 − τ y0 − τ s0
nz(1− β−1)
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Given that we will employ data for two EMU member countries, we will
explicitly consider the case where according to the implicit rules of the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact, steady-state public debt is 60% of output. In this
circumstance, instead of (A.7) we set b = 0.6 (y). This then implies that
one of the other policy instruments has to become endogenous in the long-
run to satisfy the government budget constraint. If we choose, for example,
to residually determine government transfers, then its steady-state value is
given by
gt0 = 0.6 (nz) (1− β−1)− gc0 − gi0 + τ y0 + τ s0. (A.11)
6.2 Appendix B: First-order approximation of DCE
To be in a position to solve the model, we take the first-order Taylor series
expansion of the stationary DSGE in section 2.5 around the steady-state
derived in Appendix A to obtain
byt = bat + α1bkt + α2bht + (1− α1 − α2)bkgt (B.1)
byt = c
y
bct + i
y
bit + gc0bgct + gi0bgit (B.2)
nzbkt+1 = (1− δp)bkt + i
k
bit (B.3)
bwt = η bwt−1 + (1− η)½bct +µ h
1− h
¶bht +µ τ y0
1− τ y0
¶bτ yt¾ (B.4)
Etbct+1 − bct = β (nz)−1 {£nzβ−1 + δp − 1¤µEtbrkt+1 −µ τ y01− τ y0
¶
Etbτ yt+1¶
−αp [nz + δp − 1] [nzβ−1
³bit − bkt´−µ1− δp + i
k
¶
³
Etbit+1 − bkt+1´]} (B.5)
nzbkgt+1 = (1− δg)bkgt + gi0 ykgbgit (B.6)
gc0bgct + gi0bgit + gt0bgtt + nzβ bybbt + (1− τ y0) rb bybrbt (B.7)
= nz
b
y
bbt+1 + τ y0 µ1 + rb by
¶bτ yt + (τy0 + τ s0) byt
Etbrkt+1 = Etbyt+1 − bkt+1 (B.8)
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£
nzβ−1 − 1
¤
Etbrbt+1 = £nzβ−1 + δp − 1¤Etbrkt+1 (B.9)
−
µ
δpτ y0
1− τ y0
¶
Etbτ yt+1 − αp [nz + δp − 1]µ
nzβ−1
³bit − bkt´− (1− δp + i
k
)
³
Etbit+1 − bkt+1´¶
bwt = byt − bht (B.10)
where for any variable xt, bxt = ln(xt/x); x is the model-consistent long-
run value of xt defined in sub-section 6.1.25 In other words the linearized
expressions given by (B.1−B.10) represent (i) the production function; (ii)
the aggregate expenditure identity; (iii) private investment; (iv) the condition
for employment; (v) the Euler-equation for private capital; (vi) public capital;
(vii) the government budget constraint; (viii) the return to private capital;
(ix) the Euler-equation for bonds and (x) the return to labor.
Log-linearizing the stationary laws of motion for the fiscal policy instru-
ments discussed in Section 2.6 around the steady-state derived in Appendix
A yields bgct = ¡1 + γgy − γgb¢ byt + γgbbbt (B.11)bgit = ¡1 + γiy − γib¢ byt + γibbbt (B.12)bgtt = byt (B.13)bτ yt = ρτbτ yt−1 (B.14)
Finally the log-linearized process for technology is given by
bat = ρabat−1 + εt (B.15)
6.3 Appendix C: Model solution and Watson’s mea-
sure
6.3.1 Model solution
To solve (B1)− (B10), we first substitute for (B11−B13) and then rewrite
the system in matrix form26 to obtain
Czzt = Cyλ
µ
yt
λt
¶
+Cxxt (C.1)
25Note that brbt = ln £(1 + brbt )/rb¤.
26The following discussion and notation draws on Heer and Maussner (2005, Ch. 2) and
Klein (2000). The programs used to solve the model and to calculate the Watson measure
were written from first principles in Matlab Version 7, Release 14.
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Dyλ
µ
Et [yt+1]
Et [λt+1]
¶
+Fyλ
µ
yt
λt
¶
= DzEt [zt+1]+Fzzt+DxEt [xt+1]+Fxxt (C.2)
xt+1 = Axt + ²t+1. (C.3)
The vector zt =
hbit byt bhti0 contains the control variables of the sys-
tem, and the vector yt =
hbkt bkgt bbt bwti0 represents the state variables
with initial conditions27. The co-state variables are in λt =
£ brbt bct ¤0, and
xt =
£bat bτ yt ¤0 contains the exogenous variables. Solving (C.1) for zt and
substituting the result into (C.2) reduces the system toµ
E [yt+1]
E [λt+1]
¶
=W
µ
yt
λt
¶
+Rxt, (C.4)
where
W = −
¡
Dyλ −DzC−1z Cyλ
¢−1 ¡
Fyλ − FzC−1z Cyλ
¢
;
R =
¡
Dyλ −DzC−1z Cyλ
¢−1 ¡
DzC
−1
z Cx +DxA+C
−1
z Cxxt + Fx
¢
.
The Schur decomposition of the matrixW
W = TST−1; S = T−1WT;
S =
µ
Syy Syλ
0 Sλλ
¶
=
µ
Tyy Tyλ
Tλy Tλλ
¶µ
Wyy Wyλ
Wλy Wλλ
¶µ
Tyy Tyλ
Tλy Tλλ
¶
with the eigenvalues outside the unit circle on the diagonal of Sλλ allows us
to re-express the system given by (C.4) in block recursive form, e.g.Ã
E [y˜t+1]
E
h
λ˜t+1
i!
=
µ
Syy Syλ
0 Sλλ
¶µ
y˜t
λ˜t
¶
+
µ
Qy
Qλ
¶
xt (C.5)
where µ
y˜t
λ˜t
¶
≡ T−1
µ
yt
λt
¶
;
T−1R ≡
µ
Qy
Qλ
¶
.
We next assume that the time path of λ˜t depends linearly on the exogenous
process xt, e.g. λ˜t = Φxt, and then substitute for λ˜t in (5) to obtain:
ΦAxt = SλλΦxt +Qλxt. (C.6)
27Wages bwt can be treated as state because of wage rigidity (equation B.4). We replacebrkt using equation (B.8).
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Following Klein (2000), we solve (C.6) for vec(Φ), e.g.
vec(Φ) = (A0 ⊗ I− I⊗ Sλλ)−1 vec(Qλ). (C.7)
From (C.7) we can then use the definitions in (C.5) and (C.1) to obtain the
policy functions for λt, yt+1, and zt respectively, e.g.
λt = −
¡
Tλλ
¢−1
Tλyyt +
¡
Tλλ
¢−1
Φxt (C.8)
= Lλyyt + Lλxxt;
yt+1 = Wyyyt +Wyλλt +Ryxt (C.9)
= (Wyy +WyλLλy)yt + (WyλLλx +Ry)xt
= Lyyyt + Lyxxt;
zt = C
−1
z Cyλ
µ
yt
λt
¶
+C−1z Cxxt (C.10)
= C−1z Cyλ
µ
I
Lλy
¶
yt +
µ
C−1z Cyλ
µ
0
Lλx
¶
+C−1z Cx
¶
xt
= Lzyyt + Lzxxt.
In state space form, (C.8− C.10) and the equation of motion for xt, i.e.
(C.3) can be combined to obtainµ
zt
λt
¶
=
µ
Lzy Lzx
Lλy Lλx
¶µ
yt
xt
¶
;
µ
yt+1
xt+1
¶
=
µ
Lyy Lyx
0 A
¶µ
yt
xt
¶
+
µ
0
²t+1
¶
;
or
wt = Zαt; (C.11)
αt+1 = Tαt +G²t+1. (C.12)
6.3.2 Impulse responses and Watson’s RMSAE measure
From the state-space representation in (C.11 − C.12), it is straightforward
to derive the impulse responses required for the welfare measure, ξ, and
the spectrum underlying Watson’s RMSAE. For example, the response of
(C.11− C.12) to a shock ²0 after t time periods is given by
αt = TtG²0; (C.13)
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wt = ZT
tG²0. (C.14)
The spectrum of the measurement equation, (C.11) is
F(ω)w = ZF(ω)αZ0;ω ∈ [−π,π]; (C.14)
and the spectral representation of the VAR(1) transition equation, (C.12) is
F(ω)α =
1
2π
T(ω)−1GΣG0T(ω)−?;ω ∈ [−π,π] (C.15)
whereΣ is the error variance-covariance matrix of ²t, and T(ω) is the Fourier
transform of the matrix lag polynomial T(L) = I − TL (see Priestly 1981,
section 9.4).28
6.4 Appendix D: Welfare Analysis
6.4.1 Second-order approximation of within period utility
For convenience we start by restating household h0s instantaneous log-utility
function given by (2), i.e.
Ut = lnC
h
t + µ ln(1−Hht ) + ν lnG
c
t .
This can re-expressed in terms of aggregate quantities as
Ut = ln
µ
CtZt
NtZt
¶
+ µ ln
µ
1− Ht
Nt
¶
+ ν ln
µ
GctZt
NtZt
¶
or using our notation for stationary variables as
Ut = ln (ctZt) + µ ln (1− ht) + ν ln (gctZt)
⇒ ln ct + µ ln (1− ht) + ν ln (gct ) + (1 + ν) lnZt (D.1)
where ct, ht, gct are stationary consumption, work effort and public con-
sumption respectively and Zt = zt is exogenous labor augmenting technical
progress.
Steady-state utility in turn depends on the four argument in (D.1), e.g.
U = U (c, h, gc;Z) = ln c+ µ ln (1− h) + ν ln (gc) + (1 + ν) ln (Z) . (D.2)
28L is the backshift operator; the superscript ‘?’ denotes the complex conjugate trans-
pose.
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The second-order approximation of (D.1) around (D.2) is given by
U st ' U + (U4Z) bZt + 12 ¡U44Z2 + U4Zt¢ ³ bZt´2 + (U1c)bct + (U2h)bht
+(U3g
c)bgct + 12[¡U11c2 + U1c¢ (bct)2 + ¡U22h2 + U2h¢ ³bht´2 (D.3)
+
¡
U33 (g
c)2 + U3g
c
¢
(bgct )2] +O[3]
where for any variable xt, bxt ≡ ln(xt − x); xt−xx ' bxt + 12 (bxt)2; the
s superscript denotes the second-order approximation to utility; and O[3]
contains all terms of order higher than two. Following the literature, from
here forward, these terms will be omitted.
Given the log-form of utility, the following first- and second-partial deriv-
atives in (D.3) are
U1 =
1
c
, U2 =
−µ
1−h , U3 =
ν
gc
, U4 =
1+ν
Z
,
U11 =
−1
c2
, U22 =
−µ
(1−h)2 , U33 =
−ν
(gc)2
, U44 =
−(1+ν)
Z2
so that¡
U11c
2 + U1c
¢
=
¡
U33 (g
c)2 + U3g
c
¢
=
¡
U44Z
2 + U4Zt
¢
= 0.
Substituting these two sets of relations into (D.3) gives the following within-
period aggregate utility function
U st ' U + (1 + ν) bZt+bct−µ µ1− h
¶bht+ νbgct − 12
µ
µh
(1− h)2
¶³bht´2 . (D.4)
6.4.2 Second-order approximation of constraints
We next take the second-order approximation of our model’s stationary con-
straints around the model’s steady-state detailed in Appendix A29, e.g.
byt = bat + α1bkt + α2bht + (1− α1 − α2)bkgt (D.5)
c
y
bct ' byt − i
y
bit − gc
y
bgct − giy bgit − (D.6)
1
2
∙
c
y
(bct)2 + i
y
³bit´2 + gc
y
(bgct )2 + giy ¡bgit¢2 − (byt)2
¸
29Note that relevant constraints include the production function, the economy’s resource
constraint and the two capital evolution equations. Further note that (D.5) is an exact
expression.
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ik
bit ' nzbkt+1 − (1− δp)bkt + (D.7)
1
2
∙
nz
³bkt+1´2 − (1− δp)³bkt´2 − i
k
³bit´2¸
gi
kg
bgit ' nzbkgt+1 − (1− δg)bkgt + (D.8)
+
1
2
∙
nz
³bkgt+1´2 − (1− δg)³bkgt´2 − gikg ¡bgit¢2
¸
where gc = gc0y and g
i = gi0y.
6.4.3 Second-order approximation of expected lifetime utility
Substituting (B.1−B.4) into (D.4) gives
Ut ' U + (1 + ν) bZt + y
c
[bat + α2bht − gc
y
bgct − ky{nzbkt+1 − [1− δp + α1yk ]bkt
+
1
2
[nz
³bkt+1´2 − (1− δp)³bkt´2 − i
k
³bit´2]}− kg
y
{nzbkgt+1 −
[1− δg + (1− α1 − α2) y
kg
]bkgt + 12[nz ³bkgt+1´2 − (1− δg)³bkgt´2 −(D.9)
gi
kg
¡bgit¢2]}− 12[ cy (bct)2 + iy ³bit´2 + gcy (bgct )2 + giy ¡bgit¢2 −
(byt)2]]−µ µh
1− h
¶bht + νbgct − 12
µ
µh
(1− h)2
¶³bht´2 .
The above expression can be simplified slightly by using (D.7) for squared
private investment and (D.8) for squared public investment,
i
k
³bit´2 (D.70)
' k
i
∙
(nz)2
³bkt+1´2 + (1− δp)2 ³bkt´2 − 2nz (1− δp)bkt+1bkt¸
gi
kg
¡bgit¢2 (D.80)
' k
g
gi
∙
(nz)2
³bkgt+1´2 + (1− δg)2 ³bkgt´2 − 2nz (1− δg)bkgt+1bkgt ¸ .
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For example, it can be easily shown that (D.70 −D.80) in conjunction with
the steady-state conditions for the capital evolution equations30 imply
∙
nz
³bkt+1´2 − (1− δp)³bkt´2 − i
k
³bit´2¸ (D.700)
= −nz (1− δp) k
i
³bkt+1 − bkt´2
∙
nz
³bkgt+1´2 − (1− δg)³bkgt´2 − gikg ¡bgit¢2
¸
(D.800)
= −nz (1− δg) k
g
gi
³bkgt+1 − bkgt´2 .
Substituting (D.700 −D.800) into (D.9) gives
U st ' U + (1 + ν) bZt + (D.10)
y
c
[bat + α2bht − gc
y
bgct − ky{nzbkt+1 − [1− δp + α1yk ]bkt − 12nz (1− δp)
k
i
³bkt+1 − bkt´2}− kg
y
{nzbkgt+1 − [1− δg + (1− α1 − α2) ykg ]bkgt − 12nz
(1− δg) k
g
gi
³bkgt+1 − bkgt´2}− 12[ cy (bct)2 + iy ³bit´2 + gcy (bgct )2 +
gi
y
¡bgit¢2 − (byt)2]]−µ µh1− h
¶bht + νbgct − 12
µ
µh
(1− h)2
¶³bht´2 .
Finally expected lifetime utility is given by the discounted infinite sum of
(D.10), i.e.
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtUst
#
. (D.11)
6.4.4 The social planner’s problem
In contrast to the DCE derived in section 2.5, the social planner maximizes
the expected discounted sum of (D.1) subject to the production function,
the economy’s resource constraint and the two capital evolution equations
only. To do so, the planner chooses the paths of {c∗t , h∗t , i∗t , k∗t+1, y∗t , gc∗t , gi∗t ,
kg∗t+1}∞t=0. Note that to distinguish between the DCE and planner’s solution,
a * superscript is employed. The stationary solution to the social planner’s
problem is
y∗t = at (k
∗
t )
α1 (h∗t )
α2 (kg∗t )
1−α1−α2 (D.12)
30See Appendix A equations (A.5)− (A.6).
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y∗t = c
∗
t + i
∗
t + g
c∗
t + g
i∗
t (D.13)
nzk∗t+1 = (1− δp) k∗t + i∗t −
µ
αp
2
¶ei∗2t k∗t (D.14)
nzkg∗t+1 = (1− δg) kg∗t + gi∗t (D.15)
α2y∗t
h∗t
=
µc∗
t
(1− h∗t )
(D.16)
1
c∗t
=
β
nz
Et
∙
zk∗t+1
c∗t+1
¸
(D.17)
1
c∗t
=
β
nz
Et
∙
zg∗t+1
c∗t+1
¸
(D.18)
ν
gc∗t
=
1
c∗t
(D.19)
where ei∗t ≡ µ i∗tk∗t − i
∗
k∗
¶
zk∗t+1 ≡
³
1− αpei∗t´
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
α1y∗t+1
k∗t+1
+
1− δp + αpei∗t+1 ³ i∗t+1k∗t+1´− αp2 ³ei∗t+1´2
1− αp
³ei∗t+1´
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
and
zg∗t+1 ≡
(1− α1 − α2) y∗t+1
kg∗t+1
+ 1− δg.
In other words the stationary social planner’s (SP) problem is defined by
the above system of eight nonlinear stochastic difference equations in {c∗t ,
h∗t , i
∗
t , k
∗
t+1, y
∗
t , g
c∗
t , g
i∗
t , k
g∗
t+1}∞t=0 for a given path of technology, {at}∞t=0.
Note that in contrast to the DCE: (i) there are no market failures (here
in the form of real wage rigidity); (ii) there are no policy failures (here in
the form of distortionary taxes); (iii) there is no government debt; and (iv)
public consumption and investment are chosen optimally instead of being
exogenous.
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Long-run solution of the social planner In the absence of technology
shocks, i.e. ε∗t = 0 for all t, the steady-state for the social planner’s problem
is given by the following system of equations
h∗ =
ω1ω2
µ+ ω1ω2
(D.20)
y∗ =
"
a0
µ
α1β
nz − β (1− δp)
¶α1
h∗α2
µ
gi∗0
nz + δg − 1
¶1−α1−α2#1/α2
(D.21)
c∗ = ω−12 y
∗ (D.22)
i∗ = (nz + δp − 1)
µ
α1β
nz − β(1− δp)
¶
y∗ (D.23)
k∗ =
µ
α1β
nz − β(1− δp)
¶
y∗ (D.24)
kg∗ =
µ
gi∗0
nz + δg − 1
¶
y∗ (D.25)
gi∗ =
µ
(1− α1 − α2)β (nz + δg − 1)
nz − β(1− δg)
¶
y∗ (D.26)
gc∗ = νc∗ (D.27)
where,
ω∗1 ≡ α2,
ω∗2 ≡
nz − β(1− δp)
[nz − β (1− δp)] (1− gc∗0 − gi∗0 )− (nz + δp − 1)α1β
,
gc∗0 ≡
gc∗
y∗
and
gi∗0 ≡
gi∗
y∗
.
Implementing the long-run solution of the social planner To go
from the long-run DCE to the SP’s long-run, requires that (1− τ y0) (1− τ s0)=1
or
τ s0 =
−τ y0
(1− τ y0)
< 0. (D.28a)
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In other words, we need an output subsidy to offset the distortionary
income tax in the long-run. Hence long-run lump-sum transfer/tax changes
from (A.11) to:
gt∗0 = 0.6 (nz) (1− β−1)− gc∗0 − gi∗0 + τ y0 −
τ y0
(1− τ y0)
(D.28b)
which is always negative so that it works as a lump-sum tax.
6.4.5 Implications for the approximate welfare function
To eliminate the endogenous linear deviations terms in (D.9) we make use
of the social planner’s long-run optimality conditions in (D.20−D.27). For
example, substituting (D.16) and (D.19) into (D.10) allows us to eliminate
the bht and bgct terms. Specifically, since νgc∗ = 1c∗ , the two terms with bgct sum
to zero. Similarly, since α2y
∗
h∗ =
µc∗
(1−h∗) , the two terms in
bht sum to zero.
In (D.10) we also have linear deviations terms in private and public cap-
ital, i.e. nzbkt+1 − [1 − δp + α1y∗k∗ ]bkt and nzbkgt+1 − [1 − δg + (1−α1−α2)y∗kg∗ ]bkgt .
It is straightforward to show that the social planner’s long-run optimality
conditions for private and public capital, see (D.17−D.18), imply
nz
β
³
βbkt+1 − bkt´ = nzbkt+1 − [1− δp + α1y∗
k∗
]bkt
and
nz
β
³
βbkgt+1 − bkgt´ = nzbkgt+1 − [1− δg + (1− α1 − α2) y∗kg∗ ]bkgt
in the within period utility function. Then, in the overall utility function, we
have
nz
β
bk0 = nzβ E0[³bk0 − βbk1´+ β ³bk1 − βbk2´+ ...+ βt ³bkt − βbkt+1´
+βt+1
³bkt+1 − βbkt+2´]
and similarly
nz
β
bkg0 = nzβ E0[³bkg0 − βbkg1´+ β ³bkg1 − βbkg2´+ ...+ βt ³bkgt − βbkgt+1´
+βt+1
³bkgt+1 − βbkgt+2´]
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which are constants. Note that the above two expressions are as in Edge
(2003, p. 16). Given the above, we can now write the approximate overall
welfare function (D.11) without the endogenous levels terms as
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtU st
#
(D.29)
'
µ
y∗
c∗
¶ ∙µ
k∗nz
y∗β
¶bk0 +µkg∗nz
y∗β
¶bkg0¸+E0[ ∞X
t=0
βt(U + (1 + ν) bZt
+
µ
y∗
c∗
¶bat +µy∗
c∗
¶
1
2
[
µ
k∗nz
y∗
¶
(1− δg) k
∗
i∗
³bkt+1 − bkt´2 +
kg∗nz
y∗
(1− δg)k
g∗
gi∗
³bkgt+1 − bkgt´2 − { c∗y∗ (bct)2 + i∗y∗ ³bit´2 +
gc∗
y∗
(bgct )2 + gi∗y∗ ¡bgit¢2 − (byt)2}]− 12
µ
µh∗
(1− h∗)2
¶³bht´2)].
Equation (D.29) corresponds to equation (16) in the main text.
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Figure 1: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 1% permanent productivity shock
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Figure 2: Net welfare from fiscal stabilisation of 5% permanent productivity shock
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